The K-Shaped Hotel

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  Economy hotel guest room, the losing side of the K-shaped hotel recovery

American hotels posted their first non-recessionary RevPAR decline on record in 2025. Luxury rose. Economy fell. And $51 billion of federally guaranteed hotel credit sits almost entirely on the losing half.

In the two weeks ending November 29, 2025, luxury hotel revenue per available room rose 7.3 percent against the prior year. Economy fell 8 percent.

Same country. Same fortnight. Fifteen points apart.

That gap is not a rounding artifact or a holiday-calendar quirk. It is the defining feature of the American lodging market right now, and it is almost completely invisible in the number the industry reported for the year. Full-year 2025 revenue per available room declined 0.3 percent to $100.02, with occupancy off 1.2 percent to 62.3 percent and average daily rate up 0.9 percent to $160.54.

A tenth of a percent here or there. The kind of figure that gets described as flat.

It is worth pausing on how unusual even that flat number is. Outside 2009 and 2020, the American hotel industry had never posted a full-year RevPAR decline in the modern data series. Forecasters spent the whole of 2025 walking their projections down, from an expected 2.6 percent gain at the start of the year to a small loss by November. Amanda Hite, who runs STR, framed the revision without ceremony: little change expected in the macroeconomic environment, with unemployment and prices continuing to rise.

But the aggregate is the least useful number in the file, because it describes almost no actual hotel. Take the two ends apart and the year looks like two different industries operating under one statistical roof.

The split

Through August 2025, luxury RevPAR ran up 5.3 percent year to date while economy ran down 1.8 percent. By the time the full year closed, JLL's read put luxury up 3 percent, midscale down 2.8 percent and economy down 4.4 percent, a description the firm labeled, accurately, a K-shaped recovery.

The two windows tell you something the annual figures alone do not: the divergence widened as the year went on. Early-2025 comparisons at the low end were flattered by hurricane-displacement demand that had filled economy rooms across the Gulf and Southeast. When that lapped, the floor came out.

The composition of the divergence matters more than its size. Luxury's gains were rate-driven, the segment absorbed 5.3 percent supply growth against 4 percent demand growth and still pushed ADR. Economy's losses were demand-led. In the week of July 13 to 19, economy RevPAR fell 7 percent on falling room nights, not falling rate.

Losing rate is a pricing problem. Losing occupancy is a customer problem, and it is much harder to fix.

Two further cuts point the same direction. Weekday performance has trailed weekend performance since Memorial Day 2025, which is a business-travel story. And markets outside the top twenty-five, the highway exits, the small metros, the towns with one interchange and four flags, underperformed the national line. That geography is not incidental. It is where the federally financed half of this industry lives.

This is a supply story before it is a demand story

The temptation is to read the K as a consumer-preference narrative: affluent travelers still spending, everyone else trading down or staying home. That is part of it. It is not the largest part.

Look at what got built.

The fourth-quarter 2025 construction pipeline was led by upper-midscale, with 2,275 projects and 218,526 rooms, followed by upscale at 1,336 projects and 167,316 rooms and midscale at 956 projects and 80,260 rooms. Luxury accounted for 95 projects and 22,045 rooms, and that figure was itself a record high for the segment.

Roughly three-quarters of the rooms currently under construction in the United States are limited-service.

The total pipeline stood at 6,146 projects and 720,089 rooms, with 1,088 projects and 134,380 rooms actually under construction. Openings in 2025 ran between 640 hotels and 74,079 rooms on one count and 749 hotels and 79,116 rooms on another, the two major trackers disagree by roughly 15 percent, which is worth stating plainly rather than resolving, against total supply growth near 1.3 percent. Forward projections are heavier still, with one tracker expecting 891 hotels and 99,011 rooms in 2026 and 1,688 hotels and 191,926 rooms in 2027.

So the segment with pricing power is the one nobody is building. The segments losing rate and occupancy are the ones that kept adding rooms into a softening demand environment. Luxury's ADR strength is not primarily a story about wealthy travelers. It is a story about scarcity, in a product category where new supply requires land, capital and a construction cycle that most sponsors could not underwrite at 2023 through 2025 interest rates.

The federal construction data is consistent with that reading without proving it. Private lodging construction spending has run roughly $1.8 to $2.0 billion a month into 2026, up about 3.2 percent year to date, a modest increase that looks more like cost inflation on higher-end projects than a volume expansion.

Where it actually hurts

The revenue divergence is real and it is also the mild version of what happened. The profit divergence is worse.

Start with the arithmetic that makes it inevitable. The industry's $160.54 average daily rate conceals a luxury segment operating near $278 and an economy segment operating near $75. A dollar of cost inflation lands identically on both. As a share of revenue, it is nearly four times heavier at the bottom.

That is the mechanism, and 2025 supplied plenty of dollars. Expenses above gross operating profit rose 4.1 percent and expenses below it 3.6 percent in the preceding year, against revenue growth of 2.3 percent. Sample gross operating profit margin slipped from 35.1 percent to 34.8 percent, and EBITDA margin from 23.3 percent to 22.8 percent.

The segment detail is where it gets stark. Of six property categories tracked in the major operating survey, only resort and all-suite hotels grew profit in 2025. By chain scale, only luxury and upper-upscale posted profit increases. Everything below that contracted.

The American Hotel and Lodging Association's 2026 State of the Industry report, released January 27, put the aggregate consequence in one line: rising operating expenses were a primary factor keeping gross operating profit per available room at roughly 90 percent of 2019 levels. Six years after the fact, with nominal room rates well above 2019 and an economy that has grown, the industry is earning ninety cents of pre-pandemic operating profit on the dollar.

Association president Rosanna Maietta's framing of the year was carefully balanced, operating costs remain elevated and profitability lags in many markets, even as hotels supported more than two million jobs. That is a trade group choosing its words. The underlying figures are less diplomatic.

Labor is the largest single driver and it is increasingly legislated rather than negotiated. Los Angeles adopted a hotel-worker wage schedule for properties of sixty rooms or more that runs $22.50 in July 2025, $25 in 2026, $27.50 in 2027 and $30 in 2028, plus roughly $8.35 an hour in healthcare contribution. The industry mounted a referendum against it; the effort failed to qualify in September 2025, and Maietta publicly warned the ordinance would eliminate at least 15,000 jobs. Whether or not that estimate proves right, the schedule is now a fixed cost curve running through 2028 in one of the country's largest lodging markets, and other jurisdictions are watching it.

The capital nobody chose to spend

There is a second cost shock, and it is almost perfectly targeted at the losing side of the K.

Brand-mandated property improvement plans are the price of keeping a flag. For limited-service guestrooms, PIP costs have historically run $8,000 to $25,000 a key. Midmarket requirements now run $35,000 to $40,000, according to Lee Hunter of Hunter Hotel Advisors. Joe Delli Santi of MCR described the shift concretely: a fourteen-year Hilton Garden Inn refresh that cost around $20,000 a key before the pandemic is now underwritten at $35,000 to $40,000. IHG's Holiday Inn Express program runs $10,000 to $25,000 a room. Renovation costs broadly sit more than 30 percent above pre-pandemic levels.

Run that against a 90-key limited-service asset, a typical SBA-financed property. At $15,000 to $25,000 a key, the owner faces a $1.35 million to $2.25 million mandatory capital event on the brand's schedule rather than his own, on an asset that might generate $2.5 to $3 million of annual revenue, financed at 2026 rates.

The result is visible in the flag data. Brand conversions hit a record 1,497 projects and 148,981 rooms, up 12 percent in projects and 16 percent in rooms year over year. That is not a marketing success story. A meaningful share of it is owners taking the sign off the building rather than writing the check, moving to a cheaper flag, a soft brand, or independence.

The loan tape

Which brings us to the finding that should concern anyone underwriting this asset class.

Analytics.loan's analysis of SBA 7(a) and 504 loan-level data, current through June 30, 2026, identifies 31,307 loans totaling $51.4 billion to hotels and motels under NAICS 721110. That is the single largest detailed-industry dollar concentration in the entire SBA portfolio. For scale, full-service restaurants carry about $21.3 billion and dentists about $17.4 billion. Bed-and-breakfast inns add another 1,999 loans and $1.1 billion. The lifetime charge-off rate across the hotel book is 18.6 percent, against 19.9 percent for accommodation and food services as a whole.

Now look at which hotels.

Flag	Loans	Dollars	Lifetime charge-off
Super 8	1,396	$1.4bn	13.3%
Days Inn	1,337	$1.6bn	16.5%
Comfort Inn	998	$1.8bn	12.2%
Best Western	887	$1.3bn	13.3%
Quality Inn	877	$1.8bn	23.4%
Econo Lodge	820	$977m	15.3%
Holiday Inn Express	698	$1.0bn	15.3%
Motel 6	629	$1.3bn	11.3%
Choice Hotels (umbrella)	500	$681m	28.3%
Red Roof Inn	478	$1.0bn	10.7%
Hampton Inn	452	$838m	8.8%
Marriott Hotel	71	$191m

Every heavily financed flag in that table is economy, midscale or upper-midscale limited-service. Full-service and luxury are barely present at all: 71 Marriott Hotel loans, $191 million, against 1,396 Super 8 loans.

That is the asymmetry. The segment losing RevPAR, losing occupancy, contracting on profit and carrying the heaviest brand-capital burden is also the segment carrying $51 billion of federal loan guarantee. The segment that grew rate and profit in 2025 is financed somewhere else entirely, by CMBS conduits, life companies and institutional equity.

The break points are well established in the market. Below roughly $5 million, SBA 7(a) dominates owner-operator acquisitions. From $5 million to $25 million, banks and debt funds. Above $25 million, CMBS and life companies, with life-company paper quoting 6 to 7 percent at low leverage against 1.50x coverage and 13 percent-plus debt yields, conduit at 6.5 to 8.5 percent on 65 to 70 percent leverage, and bridge and debt-fund money at 8 to 15 percent.

Two policy developments frame how this exposure is being managed. SOP 50 10 8, effective June 1, 2025, reversed the more permissive underwriting philosophy adopted in late 2023, returning the agency to prescriptive standards, reinstating the franchise directory, and strengthening independent feasibility requirements for special-purpose and limited-market properties, hotels prominently among them. And effective July 4, 2026, the agency decoupled its two programs, so a qualified borrower's 7(a) balance no longer reduces 504 capacity, allowing up to $5 million under each for $10 million combined. Franchisee groups welcomed the change; the American Hotel and Lodging trade bodies representing owner-operators continue to press for raising each program's individual ceiling to $10 million.

One honest limitation. The 18.6 percent figure is a lifetime charge-off rate across the whole book, not a fresh-cohort default rate, and it is not directly comparable to resolved-loan rates published elsewhere, those typically measure charge-offs against loans that have reached final resolution, a different and smaller denominator. Anyone setting the hotel number next to an all-industry benchmark should confirm both are computed the same way. The 2020 through 2023 approval cohorts, underwritten into a demand environment that no longer exists, have not finished seasoning.

The twenty-point spread inside one segment

There is a second finding buried in that table, and for anyone actually pricing a loan it may be the more useful one.

The charge-off rates are not uniform across the losing side of the K. Hampton Inn sits at 8.8 percent. The Choice Hotels umbrella code sits at 28.3 percent. Microtel runs 31.9 percent. Those are all limited-service, all financed through the same program, in many cases in the same kinds of markets, and they are separated by more than twenty points of realized loss.

The spread persists even within a single franchisor's portfolio. Comfort Inn charges off at 12.2 percent. Quality Inn, its stablemate, charges off at 23.4 percent, nearly double, on a nearly identical dollar book of $1.8 billion each. Meanwhile two of the deepest-economy flags in the country, Motel 6 at 11.3 percent and Red Roof Inn at 10.7 percent, sit near the bottom of the loss table, well below several upper-midscale brands that market themselves as safer credit.

Chain scale, in other words, is a weaker predictor of loan outcome than the specific flag on the building.

Several things plausibly drive that. Franchise cost structure differs materially between brands once royalty, marketing, reservation and loyalty fees are stacked, and a two-point difference in total franchise cost is a large share of a limited-service net margin. Brands deliver different RevPAR index performance against their competitive sets. And brands attract different sponsors: a franchisor in aggressive expansion mode approves weaker operators, and those approvals become loans.

That last point carries an important caveat that should temper any use of this table. These are lifetime charge-off rates spanning decades of originations, not current-vintage default rates. A brand that expanded hard into the 2005 to 2008 window carries that cohort's losses permanently in its lifetime number, regardless of how its recent loans are performing. A brand that grew mostly after 2015 has a shorter, less-seasoned book and a flattering rate that may not survive contact with a full cycle.

The practical implication is not that a lender should avoid the high-loss flags. It is that segment-level underwriting standards, the same equity injection, the same coverage test, the same reserve requirement applied to any limited-service hotel, are demonstrably too coarse for a book where realized loss varies by a factor of three within the segment. The flag is a credit variable. Most underwriting grids treat it as a marketing detail.

Who stopped showing up

The demand side deserves its own accounting, because economy's losses were driven by room nights rather than rate, and room nights come from identifiable people.

Business transient is the first and most legible. Weekday RevPAR has trailed weekend RevPAR since Memorial Day 2025, a pattern that shows up across chain scales but bites hardest at midscale and upper-midscale properties near office parks, industrial corridors and regional airports, where the Tuesday-through-Thursday base was never fully rebuilt after 2020. Group and corporate demand recovered disproportionately into upper-upscale and luxury, where meeting space and full-service capability live.

Government and government-contractor travel is the second, and it is harder to size precisely. Federal travel spending contracted through 2025, and the markets that depend on it, secondary state capitals, defense-adjacent metros, national-park gateways, are also markets where limited-service inventory concentrates. The effect is visible in the underperformance of non-top-25 markets relative to the national line, though isolating the government component from the general demand softening is not something the public data supports cleanly.

The third is the one everyone gestures at and nobody has properly quantified: the low-end consumer. Economy hotel demand tracks discretionary spending among households in the bottom half of the income distribution more tightly than any other lodging segment, and 2025 was a hard year for those households. Industry commentary consistently attributes the economy segment's demand loss to affordability pressure, and the attribution is plausible. It is also, in the currently available data, an assertion rather than a measured relationship. It should be treated as a working hypothesis, not an established finding.

There is a complicating detail worth noting alongside it. Some of the economy segment's most durable demand now comes from people who are not traveling at all, households living in extended-stay hotels because they cannot access conventional housing, traveling medical and construction workers on multi-week assignments, and in some markets municipalities placing residents directly. That demand is inelastic in a way that transient leisure demand is not, which is a large part of why extended-stay held up while roadside transient did not. It is also, for an underwriter, a materially different revenue stream than the one a transient pro forma describes: lower rate, longer stay, thinner ancillary income and considerably more operational and reputational complexity.

Where the distress actually is

The maturity wall is real and it is coming. Roughly $76.6 billion of CMBS loans face hard 2026 maturities, borrowers out of extension options, with lodging and office the two largest sector shares. The Mortgage Bankers Association puts 30 percent of all hotel and motel mortgage balances maturing in 2026, the highest share of any property type.

But the distress is not landing where the K would predict. Lodging CMBS delinquency ran 7.77 percent in April 2025, eased to 5.81 percent by late in the year, the lowest since March 2024, and rose again to 5.94 percent in February 2026, with the lodging special-servicing rate climbing to 10.01 percent. Those are elevated readings, not crisis readings.

And within them, full-service dominates. Roughly 40 to 45 percent of full-service hotel loans are flagged as troubled, against 15 to 20 percent for limited-service. Park Hotels disclosed $1.598 billion of 2026 mortgage maturities and sold a 396-room full-service airport hotel at about $45,000 a key, a sub-replacement-cost mark that sets a floor for the segment.

The transaction market, meanwhile, is functioning. Volume reached $24 billion in 2025, up 17.5 percent, led by luxury portfolio trades, with the cost of debt down roughly 300 basis points since the Federal Reserve began cutting in September 2024. Cap rates for luxury and upper-upscale sit near 8.1 percent. EBITDA multiples run 6 to 9 times for economy and midscale against 10 to 13 times for upper-upscale and luxury, a valuation gap that is itself a compact statement of the K.

What cuts against this

Four pieces of evidence complicate the reading above, and they deserve to be taken seriously.

The first is measurement. The full-census data says 2025 RevPAR fell 0.3 percent. A widely used same-store profit panel puts the decline at 6.3 percent. Six points is not a rounding difference; it is a different universe, every open hotel versus a panel of properties reporting full operating statements. The K is real in both. Its magnitude depends on which file you open.

The second is that economy is not one thing. Extended-stay hotels finished the fourth quarter of 2025 with occupancy at 71.3 percent, fourteen points above the overall industry, and grew room revenue 2 percent while the total industry fell 2 percent. That outperformance extends into economy extended-stay specifically, the WoodSpring and Extended Stay America end of the market, where demand from traveling workers, construction crews and, increasingly, households using hotels as housing has held up. The segment's own analysts caution that extended-stay RevPAR is unlikely to turn positive before the second quarter of 2026 at the earliest. But a transient economy motel on an interstate and an economy extended-stay property in a growth market are not the same business, and lumping them together overstates the collapse.

The third is that limited-service defends margin better than its revenue line suggests. It is a fundamentally lower-labor product, no restaurant, no banquet department, minimal front-of-house. The same profit panel that recorded a 6.3 percent revenue decline found gross operating profit percentage actually improved year over year, which is cost discipline working.

The fourth is that hotels are not, historically, bad SBA credit. At 18.6 percent lifetime charge-off, the hotel book outperforms accommodation and food services overall at 19.9 percent, and comfortably beats full-service restaurants at 22.6 percent and limited-service restaurants at 23.2 percent. Real property collateral and reasonably predictable cash flow make an established hotel a better guarantee risk than most operating businesses. The concentration is asymmetric. The performance, so far, is not alarming.

There is a fifth wrinkle that cuts the other way from the thesis. The winning segment is the one most exposed to the year's largest demand shock. International inbound travel to the United States fell in 2025, overnight arrivals down 8.2 percent against an expected gain near 9 percent, inbound spending off 4.2 percent or roughly $8.3 billion, and total visits down from 72.4 million to 67.9 million, the first decline since 2020. One global forecast had the United States as the only one of 184 economies projected to lose international visitor spending. That damage concentrates in gateway luxury and upper-upscale hotels. Luxury won 2025 with a significant headwind in its face, which arguably strengthens rather than weakens the case for its pricing power.

What we are watching

Five measurable things will determine whether 2025 was an inflection or an outlier.

Economy RevPAR is the first. Two consecutive quarters of positive year-over-year growth would end the deterioration story at the bottom of the K.

The spread is the second. Luxury and economy RevPAR growth are currently separated by roughly 700 basis points on a full-year basis. Compression below about 300 would mean the divergence is closing on its own.

The SBA cohorts are third and most consequential for lenders. The 2020 through 2023 hotel approvals were underwritten into pandemic-era and immediately post-pandemic assumptions. If those vintages resolve above the 18.6 percent lifetime rate as they season, the federal exposure repricing becomes a real event rather than a structural observation.

The maturity wall is fourth. Whether the $76.6 billion resolves through extensions and modifications, as most of the last three years' maturities have, or through distressed sales will determine how much of the segment's basis gets reset.

The fifth is the conversion pipeline, currently 1,497 projects. It is the cleanest available proxy for owners deciding a brand's capital requirements exceed what the asset can carry. If that number keeps climbing, the PIP burden is doing more damage than the revenue data shows.

Until those move, the accurate description of the American hotel industry is not a downturn. It is a business that reported a flat year while running two different companies inside itself, one with scarcity pricing and expanding margins, financed by institutions, and one with growing supply, contracting profit, a mandatory capital bill and $51 billion of federal guarantee behind it.

The country did not build too many hotels in 2025. It built the wrong half.

Methodology

Figures on SBA lending volume, brand-level loan counts, dollar concentration and charge-off rates are Analytics.loan's analysis of the Small Business Administration's 7(a) and 504 loan-level FOIA datasets, filtered to NAICS 721110 (Hotels and Motels, except Casino Hotels) and 721191 (Bed-and-Breakfast Inns), current through June 30, 2026. Charge-off rates stated here are lifetime charge-offs across the full book and are not directly comparable to resolved-loan default rates published elsewhere, which use a smaller denominator. Approval cohorts from 2020 through 2023 have not finished seasoning.

Occupancy, ADR and RevPAR figures are from STR and CoStar public releases, including the full-year 2025 release of January 20, 2026. Segment figures come from two windows and are labeled accordingly: year-to-date-August comparisons and full-year comparisons draw on different samples and periods and should not be blended. Readers should also note that the full-census RevPAR figure for 2025 (−0.3 percent) and same-store operating-panel figures (−6.3 percent) differ materially because they measure different universes; the range is stated rather than reconciled. Supply and pipeline figures are from published construction trackers, which disagree on 2025 openings by roughly 15 percent, both counts are given.

Profit, GOPPAR and expense figures are from CBRE Hotel Horizons and the American Hotel and Lodging Association's 2026 State of the Industry report, released January 27, 2026. PIP cost figures reflect published practitioner estimates. CMBS delinquency and maturity figures are from Trepp; mortgage maturity shares are from the Mortgage Bankers Association. Transaction volume and pricing are from JLL. International travel figures are from Tourism Economics, the US Travel Association and the National Travel and Tourism Office. Construction spending is from the Census Bureau's Value of Construction Put in Place, private lodging series. Forward figures, 2026 and 2027 RevPAR forecasts, projected openings, and guest spending projections, are forecasts, not results.

Key figures for citation

Metric	Value
US RevPAR, full-year 2025	$100.02, −0.3%, first decline outside 2009 and 2020
Occupancy / ADR, 2025	62.3% (−1.2%) / $160.54 (+0.9%)
Luxury vs economy RevPAR, YTD August 2025	+5.3% vs −1.8%
Luxury / midscale / economy RevPAR, full-year	+3% / −2.8% / −4.4%
Share of rooms under construction that are limited-service	~75%
Luxury share of Q4 2025 pipeline	95 projects / 22,045 rooms
GOPPAR vs 2019	~90%
Chain scales posting 2025 profit growth	Luxury and upper-upscale only
Limited-service PIP cost	$8,000-$25,000/key; midmarket $35,000-$40,000
Implied PIP for a 90-key asset	$1.35m-$2.25m
Record brand conversions, 2025	1,497 projects / 148,981 rooms
SBA hotel exposure (NAICS 721110)	31,307 loans / $51.4bn, largest detailed-NAICS concentration
Lifetime charge-off, SBA hotel book	18.6% (vs 19.9% accommodation and food services)
CMBS loans facing hard 2026 maturity	$76.6bn
Share of hotel mortgage balances maturing 2026	30%, highest of any property type
Troubled-loan share, full-service vs limited-service	40-45% vs 15-20%
EBITDA multiples, economy/midscale vs luxury	6-9x vs 10-13x

Frequently asked questions

Did US hotel RevPAR fall in 2025?

Yes. Full-year revenue per available room declined 0.3 percent to $100.02, with occupancy off 1.2 percent to 62.3 percent and average daily rate up 0.9 percent to $160.54. Outside 2009 and 2020, the industry had never posted a full-year RevPAR decline in the modern data series.

What is the K-shaped hotel recovery?

The divergence between the top and bottom of the market. Through August 2025 luxury RevPAR ran up 5.3 percent year to date while economy ran down 1.8 percent. For the full year, luxury finished up 3 percent, midscale down 2.8 percent and economy down 4.4 percent. Luxury gains were rate-driven; economy losses were demand-led, which is the harder problem to fix.

How much SBA debt is in US hotels?

Hotels and motels carry 31,307 loans totaling $51.4 billion, the single largest detailed-industry dollar concentration in the SBA portfolio. Every heavily financed flag is economy, midscale or upper-midscale limited-service: Super 8 has 1,396 loans against 71 for Marriott Hotel. Lifetime charge-off across the hotel book is 18.6 percent, against 19.9 percent for accommodation and food services overall.

What does a hotel PIP cost?

Limited-service guestroom property improvement plans have historically run $8,000 to $25,000 a key, with midmarket requirements now at $35,000 to $40,000. For a 90-key limited-service asset that implies a $1.35 million to $2.25 million mandatory capital event on the brand's schedule rather than the owner's. Renovation costs sit more than 30 percent above pre-pandemic levels, and brand conversions hit a record 1,497 projects as owners took signs off buildings rather than fund the work.

How much hotel debt matures in 2026?

Roughly $76.6 billion of CMBS loans face hard 2026 maturities with borrowers out of extension options, with lodging and office the two largest sector shares. The Mortgage Bankers Association puts 30 percent of all hotel and motel mortgage balances maturing in 2026, the highest share of any property type.

Are limited-service hotels in distress?

Less than the revenue data suggests. Roughly 40 to 45 percent of full-service hotel loans are flagged as troubled against 15 to 20 percent for limited-service, so the acute CMBS distress is a full-service problem. Limited-service also defends margin better because it carries far less labor. The concern is the asymmetry of federal exposure rather than an imminent wave of failures.

Analytics.loan produces lender-grade feasibility and market analysis for SBA, USDA and conventional commercial real estate credit.

Sources:

• U.S. Small Business Administration, 7(a) and 504 loan-level FOIA datasets, NAICS 721110 (Hotels and Motels) and 721191 (Bed-and-Breakfast Inns), through June 30, 2026

• U.S. Small Business Administration, SOP 50 10 8, effective June 1, 2025, and Policy Notice 5000-879058

• American Hotel and Lodging Association, 2026 State of the Industry report

• CBRE Hotel Horizons, profit, GOPPAR and expense data

• Trepp, CMBS lodging delinquency and special servicing rates and 2026 maturity analysis

• Mortgage Bankers Association, commercial and multifamily mortgage maturity shares

• JLL, hotel transaction volume and pricing

• Tourism Economics, US Travel Association and the National Travel and Tourism Office, international inbound travel

• U.S. Census Bureau, Value of Construction Put in Place, private lodging series

• Published construction pipeline trackers and practitioner PIP cost estimates