Financing the Child Care Desert

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  Empty tables and chairs in a licensed child care classroom

Forty-six percent of American children under six live where licensed care is scarce. The standard prescription is better capital access. The loan data says capital is not the constraint.

Start with the number that inverts the whole conversation.

In 2025, 46 percent of American children under age six lived in what researchers call a licensed child care desert, meaning more than three young children for every licensed slot within reach. Among children under six living in poverty, the figure was 44 percent.

Poor children are slightly less likely to live in a child care desert than the average American child.

That single comparison, from the Center for American Progress analysis conducted with the Upjohn Institute and Stanford and published in 2026, breaks the framing that most coverage of this sector uses. The desert is not primarily a poverty phenomenon. Subsidized capacity, Head Start, and state pre-K concentrate where poverty concentrates. What the desert map actually traces is something harder to fix with a grant program: places where there are not enough children close enough together to fill a center, or not enough household income to pay what a center costs to run.

For a lender, that distinction is the entire question. The policy conversation says the sector needs capital. The loan data says capital is available, correctly priced, and not the thing standing between a desert and a child care center.

What a desert actually measures

The definition matters because the headline number gets quoted loosely.

A family lives in a licensed child care desert if there are more than three local children under six per local licensed slot. The current methodology uses continuous distance between families and providers rather than census tract or ZIP code boundaries, which matters because arbitrary geographic lines cut through real child care markets.

By that measure the national picture has improved. The share stood at 51 percent in 2018 and 46 percent in 2025, though the two analyses used slightly different collection approaches and census periods, so the comparison is directional rather than exact.

The improvement is not evenly distributed. In the most remote rural areas, 70 percent of young children live in a desert. Across congressional districts, 42 percent have more than half their young children in deserts, and 14 districts exceed 80 percent. Rural districts run 49.1 percent against 41.9 percent suburban and 45.6 percent urban.

The state spread is enormous. At the low end sit Washington, D.C. at 5 percent, Massachusetts at 21 percent, and New Jersey and Nebraska at roughly 25 percent each. At the high end are Idaho at 83 percent, Hawaii at 95 percent, and Alaska at 96 percent.

Head Start deserts are effectively universal. Roughly 99.7 percent of qualifying low-income children in urban areas and about 97 percent in rural areas lived in a Head Start desert in 2025.

Look at the two ends of the state list and the pattern is not about credit. The best-covered jurisdictions are high income, high density, and heavily subsidized. The worst are either extremely low density, like Alaska and Idaho, or extremely high cost, like Hawaii. Neither problem is solved by a loan.

The collapse that did not happen

Before going further it is worth dealing with the sector's defining recent event, because the forecast and the outcome diverged sharply and both matter.

The American Rescue Plan created $24 billion in child care stabilization grants, which supported roughly 220,000 providers and expired on September 30, 2023. In the run-up, the Century Foundation projected that more than 70,000 programs would close, approximately 3.2 million children would lose their spots, parents would lose around $9 billion a year in earnings, and the sector would shed 232,000 jobs.

That is not what happened.

Licensed center counts rose about 1.5 percent between 2023 and 2024, continuing a trend that had run since 2020. Licensed family child care homes rose 4.3 percent over the same period, reversing several years of decline. The number of licensed centers in the states with complete data went from 84,592 in 2020 to 92,550 in 2024.

The first genuine contraction did not arrive until 2025, when center counts fell about 1 percent, the first decrease after several years of growth, while family child care homes rose another 1.4 percent.

Two readings are available and both are defensible. The generous one is that states backfilled: Wisconsin directed $170 million to continue its stabilization program through June 2025, Kentucky added $50 million, New York and others acted similarly, and a Council of Economic Advisers analysis found states with stopgap funding were measurably more resilient. The skeptical one is that advocacy modeling systematically overestimates closure risk in a sector where operators absorb pain rather than exit, because the operator is usually the owner and the business is usually her livelihood.

Either way, the 2025 decline is the first clean post-subsidy signal, and it is a 1 percent decline, not a collapse. Anyone underwriting this sector should hold both facts: the cliff was real, and the sector did not fall off it.

The unit economic

Here is why the sector is hard to finance, and it has nothing to do with lender appetite.

The national average annual price of child care was $13,184 in 2025, up marginally from $13,128 in 2024. That price consumes about 10 percent of median income in a two-parent household and 33 percent in a single-parent household. In every state with data, care for two children in a center costs more than median rent. In 41 states and the District of Columbia, infant care in a center costs more than in-state university tuition.

Those numbers are usually presented as an affordability crisis for families, which they are. They are also a revenue ceiling for the operator, which is the part lenders care about.

Now the cost side. Roughly 70 to 80 percent of a child care provider's operating costs are personnel, according to the federal Office of Child Care. State-mandated staff-to-child ratios for infants run as tight as one to three or one to four. Those two facts together determine almost everything.

Work the arithmetic on a single infant room. Child care professionals in a center earn an average of about $33,140 a year. Load that with payroll taxes, workers compensation and any benefits and the employer cost lands near $40,000. At a one-to-four infant ratio, that one teacher supports four infants, which is roughly $10,000 per infant in direct classroom labor before rent, utilities, food, insurance, licensing, administration, or any return on the building.

Against an average national price of $13,184.

The state-level cost data confirms what that implies. Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis analysis found the cost of providing infant care exceeded the cost of preschool care in every single state. In Missouri, infant care costs about $13,600 against $6,600 for a preschool-aged child, more than double.

This is why infant rooms lose money almost everywhere, and why a functioning center cross-subsidizes them with three-year-old and four-year-old classrooms where ratios stretch to one to ten or beyond. It is also why the shortage is worst precisely where it is most needed: infant capacity is the least profitable thing a center can build.

And the labor cost is not going down. The median hourly wage for child care workers was $15.41 in May 2024, against $23.80 across all US occupations, placing child care in the bottom 5 percent of all occupational median wages. The Bureau of Labor Statistics projects employment in the occupation to decline 3 percent between 2024 and 2034, with roughly 160,200 annual openings, every one of them from replacement rather than growth.

An industry that cannot raise wages without raising a price parents already cannot afford, in an occupation the federal government projects will shrink, is not a credit problem. It is a margin problem.

The map mismatch

Put the desert map beside the affordability map and the mismatch is the article's central finding.

The states with the worst coverage are low density or extreme cost. Alaska at 96 percent and Idaho at 83 percent are sparse. Hawaii at 95 percent is expensive. The states with the best coverage, Washington D.C., Massachusetts, New Jersey and Nebraska, are dense, higher income, and in most cases running meaningful state subsidy programs.

Add the poverty finding from the top of this piece. Children in poverty are marginally less likely to live in a desert than children generally, because public capacity follows public need.

What is left in the middle is the actual desert population: working and middle income households, in places too thinly settled to fill a center at capacity, earning too much to qualify for subsidy and too little to pay unsubsidized infant rates. That is a demand-side gap wearing a supply-side label.

The consequence for site selection is direct. A desert score tells you demand is unmet. It does not tell you demand is financeable. Those are different questions, and only the second one determines whether a center opens and stays open.

The loan tape

Which brings us to what lenders have actually done, and the answer is more interesting than the advocacy framing predicts.

Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago analysis of SBA loan-level data found that in 2023, childcare businesses borrowed more than $1.103 billion through the 7(a) and 504 programs across 991 loans. That was $565 million across 793 loans under 7(a), about 2 percent of total 7(a) lending, and $538 million across 196 loan pairs under 504, about 4 percent of total 504 lending. Total lending under both programs that year was $42.2 billion across 64,757 loans.

This is not a sector being denied credit. It is a small sector borrowing a proportionate share.

The structure of that borrowing is revealing. One hundred percent of 504 loans to childcare businesses were 20 or 25 year loans for real estate, and more than 30 percent of 7(a) childcare loans were real estate loans with terms of 20 years or more. The most common 7(a) structure for childcare was a 120 month loan at a 75 percent guarantee, representing a quarter of childcare loans, followed by a 300 month loan at 75 percent, representing about a fifth of childcare loans against just 8 percent of 7(a) loans generally.

Childcare borrows long and borrows for buildings, which is what a facilities-intensive business does.

Now the price. On 300 month loans at a 75 percent guarantee, childcare businesses paid an average initial rate of 9.42 percent in 2023 against 9.11 percent for non-childcare borrowers, roughly 3 percent higher. On 120 month loans at the same guarantee, childcare paid 9.92 percent against 10.30 percent, roughly 4 percent lower.

The split is the finding. Short money funds equipment and working capital and is underwritten against a business that is straightforward to assess, and childcare gets a better rate there than the average borrower. Long money funds buildings, and when a lender prices a building it is really pricing the twenty-five years of operating cash flow behind it. On that horizon, childcare gets priced worse than the market.

On a $1 million loan over 300 months, that 31 basis point premium is $211 a month, with a net present value of $36,037 over the life of the loan.

The industry comparison sharpens it further. Among the six-digit industries taking the most 300 month 7(a) loans at a 75 percent guarantee in 2023, childcare ranked fourth by volume at 9.42 percent. Ahead of it on volume were hotels and motels at 9.52 percent, full-service restaurants at 9.40 percent, and gas stations with convenience stores at 9.62 percent. Below it were offices of physicians at 7.96 percent and offices of dentists at 7.47 percent, and the all-other-industries average was 9.02 percent.

Child care real estate is priced like a restaurant, not like a dental practice. It sits roughly two full points above dentistry on twenty-five year money.

There is one more structural detail worth flagging. Childcare borrowers were about 30 percent more likely than non-childcare borrowers to obtain their 300 month 7(a) loans from nondepository lenders, at 13.0 percent against 9.7 percent. Nonbank pricing is materially worse: for childcare, 10.61 percent against 9.24 percent at a bank on the same structure. On a $1 million loan that difference runs $968 a month, or $165,531 over the loan's life.

And a large slice of the sector cannot access these programs at all. Nonprofit operators, who represent just under a quarter of the childcare industry, are ineligible for SBA lending entirely because the programs require a for-profit operating business.

Put it together and the picture is coherent. Capital reaches this sector. It arrives priced for the risk the cash flows actually carry, which is restaurant risk rather than professional-practice risk, and disproportionately from the most expensive lender channel. Lenders looked at the same unit economics laid out above and reached the same conclusion.

The format that is growing needs no capital

There is a natural experiment running inside the supply data, and it points the same direction as the loan pricing.

Licensed centers fell about 1 percent between 2024 and 2025. Over the same period, licensed family child care homes rose 1.4 percent, having already risen 4.3 percent the year before, reversing several years of decline.

The capital-intensive format is contracting. The format that requires almost no capital is expanding.

A family child care home operates in the provider's existing house. There is no site acquisition, no lease, no buildout, no commercial kitchen, no separate playground construction, no landlord, and no debt service. The licensing footprint is lighter, the ratio requirements are structured differently, and the operator is the staff. Fixed cost is close to zero because the fixed cost was already there as a residence.

That is capacity no lender financed, no CDFI underwrote and no SBA guarantee touched. It simply appeared, in a market that wanted more supply, in the only form that could be delivered without a capital stack.

The honest caveat is important and cuts against reading too much into it. A family child care home typically serves somewhere between six and twelve children against sixty to well over a hundred at a center, so a 1.4 percent gain in homes does not come close to offsetting a 1 percent loss in centers measured in slots. Home-based capacity is also disproportionately what rural families actually get, which is part of why remote rural areas still show 70 percent of young children in a desert despite the growth.

But as evidence about what the binding constraint is, it is hard to argue with. When demand is unmet and credit is available, the supply that materializes is the version that needs no credit. That is what a market looks like when the problem is operating margin rather than financing.

The distress data on the capital-intensive side supports the same reading. Higher Ground Education, once the largest Montessori operator in the world, filed for Chapter 11 in June 2025. Chain closures have clustered around two patterns: leases signed in 2019 renewing at 30 to 50 percent increases, and franchisee distress once enrollment falls below roughly 65 to 70 percent of capacity for more than two consecutive quarters. Neither of those is a credit access problem. Both are occupancy cost meeting a revenue ceiling.

The channel that is actually growing

If parent tuition cannot support the cost of care, the question becomes who else can pay. Two things happened in 2025 and 2026 that answer it.

The first is legislative. The One Big Beautiful Bill Act, signed July 4, 2025, rebuilt the Section 45F employer-provided child care credit for tax years beginning after December 31, 2025. The credit rate on qualified child care expenditures rose from 25 percent to 40 percent, and to 50 percent for eligible small businesses with five-year average gross receipts below roughly $31 million. The annual cap rose from $150,000 to $500,000, and to $600,000 for eligible small businesses, indexed for inflation after 2026. Eligibility expanded to cover payments to third-party intermediaries that contract with child care facilities, and to facilities jointly owned by multiple employers.

That last provision matters more than the headline rate. It means four small businesses can jointly contract with one center, each claiming the credit on its share, without any of them building anything.

Historically almost nobody used this credit. The Government Accountability Office estimated that only 169 to 278 companies claimed it on 2016 corporate returns. The 2025 changes are the first serious attempt to make it usable.

The second thing that happened is that two public operators reported results which tell the same story from opposite directions.

Bright Horizons, whose model is employer-sponsored, executed a net reduction of 90 centers between December 31, 2022 and March 31, 2026, an 8.3 percent reduction in its physical footprint. Chief executive Stephen Kramer described the logic plainly on a recent call: the company closed 24 centers in the quarter "as we continue to position our portfolio to serve employees of our client partners and working parents where they live and work." Chief financial officer Elizabeth Boland gave the arithmetic behind it, noting that the bottom cohort of centers running below 40 percent occupancy had fallen from 13 percent of the portfolio a year earlier to 8 percent.

And yet the business grew. Third quarter 2025 revenue was $802.8 million, up 12 percent, with income from operations up 35 percent to $120.8 million and adjusted EBITDA up 29 percent to $156 million, driven substantially by back-up care utilization. Kramer's summary: the quarter "again highlights the value of our unique employer sponsored model."

Now the contrast. KinderCare, whose model is parent tuition, reported fiscal 2025 results in March 2026 across 2,754 centers and sites serving approximately 219,000 children daily in 41 states and the District of Columbia. It beat on earnings and then guided fiscal 2026 adjusted EBITDA to $210 million to $230 million against the $300 million achieved in fiscal 2025.

The assumptions underneath that guidance are the story: occupancy expected to decline about 3 percent, partially offset by tuition increases of about 3 percent, with center closures taking roughly another 1 percent. The clear growth line was Champions, its before and after school program operating on school district property, which reached 1,153 sites from 1,025 and generated $215 million of revenue.

Two of the largest operators in the country, and both are moving the same direction. Away from the standalone center funded by parent tuition, and toward capacity funded or hosted by an institution: an employer, a school district, a campus.

What this means for a site

For anyone underwriting a specific center, the practical translation is short.

The financeable site is not the site with the worst desert score. It is the site where a payer other than the parent exists. That means an employer partner or a group of them now able to use an expanded 45F credit, a school district contract, a hospital or university campus, a state with a subsidy reimbursement rate that approaches the private rate, or a Head Start or state pre-K allocation. Absent one of those, the trade area has to contain enough households able to pay unsubsidized infant rates, which in most desert geographies is precisely what it does not contain.

Four checks follow from that. First, the state infant ratio, because it sets the cost floor for the least profitable room in the building and no operating skill overcomes it. Second, the ratio of the state subsidy reimbursement to the private market rate, which determines whether subsidized enrollment is revenue or charity. Third, whether the site can realistically reach 65 to 70 percent occupancy, the level below which franchise operators consistently report distress once it persists across two quarters. Fourth, the lease, since centers that signed in 2019 have been renewing into 30 to 50 percent rent increases, and occupancy cost is the one line an operator cannot cut without moving.

What we are watching

Five things will settle whether the sector stabilizes or contracts from here.

The first is whether the 1 percent decline in licensed centers recorded in 2025 extends into 2026. One year is a signal. Two is a trend, and it would be the first sustained contraction in the post-pandemic period.

The second is 45F claim volume in the first filing season under the new rules. The credit has been available for two decades and essentially unused. If claims move from the hundreds into the thousands, the employer channel becomes a real financing source rather than a policy aspiration.

The third is the next desert update. The share improved from 51 percent to 46 percent between 2018 and 2025. If the next reading reverses, the supply improvement of the past several years was subsidy-driven and did not survive its withdrawal.

The fourth is KinderCare occupancy against its own guidance of a 3 percent decline. It is the cleanest public proxy for parent-funded demand at scale.

The fifth is SBA pricing. Childcare currently pays roughly 30 basis points more than the general market for twenty-five year real estate money, and about two full points more than dentistry. If that premium widens, lenders are marking the operating risk higher. If it narrows toward the professional-practice codes, something in the unit economics has genuinely improved.

Until those move, the honest description of the American child care market is not a sector starved of capital. It is a sector where the cost of delivering the service under mandated ratios exceeds what most families in most of the underserved geography can pay, where lenders have priced that accurately, and where the only durable growth is coming from the places a third party has agreed to cover the difference.

The desert is real. It is not, mostly, a financing problem.

Methodology

Child care desert figures are from the Center for American Progress analysis conducted with the W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research and Stanford University, covering 2025 and published in 2026. A desert is defined as a location with more than three children under age six per licensed child care slot, measured using continuous distance between families and providers. The 2018 comparison figure of 51 percent was produced using a slightly different collection approach and census period, so the change over time is directional rather than precise.

Price and supply figures are from Child Care Aware of America's Child Care in America: 2025 Price and Supply report, released May 14, 2026, which averages three methods across the 47 states with available price data. Supply counts reflect only the states with complete data in each year and are not a national census.

SBA lending figures are from Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago analysis of SBA 7(a) and 504 loan-level data for calendar year 2023, published February 2025. The loan-level files are public and available at data.sba.gov, and the analysis can be independently reproduced and extended to more recent vintages. Interest rates shown are initial rates at origination; just over 85 percent of 7(a) loans carried variable rates in 2023, so realized rates differ. Nonprofit providers, roughly a quarter of the sector, are ineligible for these programs and do not appear in the data at all.

Wage and employment projections are from the Bureau of Labor Statistics. Cost-of-care comparisons by state are from Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis analysis. Personnel share of operating cost is from the federal Office of Child Care. Operator results are from Bright Horizons and KinderCare public disclosures. Section 45F provisions reflect the statute as amended effective for tax years beginning after December 31, 2025; note that at least one congressional summary describes the new credit rate as 50 percent rather than 40 percent, and readers should work from the statutory text and current IRS guidance rather than secondary summaries.

Closure projections attributed to the 2023 funding expiration were forecasts published before the event and are presented here alongside the measured outcome, which differed substantially.

Key figures for citation

Metric	Value
Children under six in a licensed child care desert, 2025	46% (51% in 2018)
Children under six in poverty in a desert	44%, below the national average
Most remote rural areas	70% of young children in a desert
State range	Alaska 96%, Hawaii 95%, Idaho 83% / D.C. 5%, Massachusetts 21%
Head Start deserts	~99.7% urban, ~97% rural
National average annual price of care, 2025	$13,184
Share of household income	10% two-parent, 33% single-parent
Personnel share of provider operating cost	70% to 80%
Infant staff-to-child ratios	As tight as 1:3 or 1:4
Median child care worker wage, May 2024	$15.41/hour vs $23.80 all occupations
Projected occupational employment change, 2024-2034	Decline of 3%
Cost of infant vs preschool care, Missouri	$13,600 vs $6,600
Licensed centers, 2024 vs 2025	+1.5% then -1%
ARPA stabilization funding	$24bn, ~220,000 providers, expired 30 Sept 2023
Projected vs actual closures	70,000+ programs forecast; centers grew in 2024
SBA lending to childcare, 2023	$1.103bn across 991 loans
Share of 7(a) / 504 program totals	2% / 4%
25-year 7(a) rate, childcare vs market	9.42% vs 9.11%
Same rate vs dentistry / physicians	7.47% / 7.96%
Nonbank share of childcare 25-year loans	13.0% vs 9.7% for other industries
Section 45F credit rate and cap, from 2026	40% (50% small business), $500,000 ($600,000)
Companies claiming 45F on 2016 returns	169 to 278
Bright Horizons center reduction, Dec 2022 to Mar 2026	90 centers, 8.3% of footprint
KinderCare FY2026 EBITDA guidance vs FY2025 actual	$210-230m vs $300m

Frequently asked questions

What is a child care desert?

A licensed child care desert is a location with more than three children under age six for every licensed child care slot within reach. The current methodology measures continuous distance between families and providers rather than using census tract or ZIP code boundaries, which avoids arbitrarily splitting real child care markets. In 2025, 46 percent of American children under six lived in one, down from 51 percent in 2018.

Which states have the worst child care shortages?

Alaska at 96 percent, Hawaii at 95 percent and Idaho at 83 percent have the highest share of young children living in a licensed child care desert. The lowest are Washington, D.C. at 5 percent, Massachusetts at 21 percent, and New Jersey and Nebraska at roughly 25 percent each. The pattern tracks population density, household income and state subsidy programs rather than credit availability.

How much does child care cost in the US?

The national average annual price was $13,184 in 2025, consuming about 10 percent of median income in a two-parent household and 33 percent in a single-parent household. In every state with data, care for two children in a center costs more than median rent, and in 41 states plus the District of Columbia infant care in a center costs more than in-state university tuition.

Why is infant care so expensive?

State-mandated staff-to-child ratios for infants run as tight as one to three or one to four, and personnel accounts for 70 to 80 percent of a provider's operating costs. At a one-to-four ratio, a single teacher earning an industry-average wage represents roughly $10,000 per infant in direct classroom labor before rent, food, insurance, licensing or administration. Federal Reserve analysis found infant care costs exceed preschool care costs in every state; in Missouri the figures are about $13,600 against $6,600.

Can you get an SBA loan for a child care center?

Yes, and the sector uses the programs actively. In 2023 childcare businesses borrowed more than $1.1 billion across 991 SBA 7(a) and 504 loans, about 2 percent of total 7(a) lending and 4 percent of total 504 lending. All 504 childcare loans that year were 20 or 25 year real estate loans. Nonprofit providers, roughly a quarter of the sector, are ineligible because the programs require a for-profit operating business.

What interest rate do child care centers pay on SBA loans?

It depends on the term. On 25 year 7(a) real estate loans in 2023, childcare businesses paid an average initial rate of 9.42 percent against 9.11 percent for non-childcare borrowers, roughly 3 percent higher, with a net present value cost of about $36,000 on a $1 million loan. On 10 year loans childcare paid less than the market, 9.92 percent against 10.30 percent. Childcare real estate prices close to hotels and restaurants and roughly two points above dental practices.

What changed with the employer child care tax credit in 2025?

The One Big Beautiful Bill Act, signed July 4, 2025, rebuilt Section 45F for tax years beginning after December 31, 2025. The credit rate on qualified child care expenditures rose from 25 percent to 40 percent, and to 50 percent for eligible small businesses with five-year average gross receipts below roughly $31 million. The annual cap rose from $150,000 to $500,000, and to $600,000 for small businesses, indexed for inflation. Eligibility expanded to include payments to third-party intermediaries and jointly owned facilities, allowing several employers to contract with one center and each claim the credit on its share.

Did child care centers close after the federal pandemic funding ended?

Far fewer than forecast. The $24 billion in stabilization grants supporting roughly 220,000 providers expired on September 30, 2023, and pre-expiration modeling projected more than 70,000 program closures and 3.2 million children losing spots. In practice licensed center counts rose about 1.5 percent from 2023 to 2024 and family child care homes rose 4.3 percent. The first decline came in 2025, at about 1 percent for centers, while family child care homes continued to grow. Several states backfilled with their own funds.

Analytics.loan produces lender-grade feasibility and market analysis for SBA, USDA and conventional commercial real estate credit.

Sources:

• Center for American Progress, with the W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research and Stanford University, licensed child care desert analysis, 2025 data

• Child Care Aware of America, Child Care in America: 2025 Price and Supply report, released May 14, 2026

• Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, analysis of SBA 7(a) and 504 lending to childcare businesses, published February 2025

• U.S. Small Business Administration, 7(a) and 504 loan-level FOIA datasets, NAICS 624410 (Child Day Care Services)

• Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, cost of infant versus preschool care by state

• U.S. Office of Child Care, provider operating cost composition

• U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, childcare worker wages and occupational employment projections

• U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, American Rescue Plan child care stabilization program

• The Century Foundation, pre-expiration closure projections

• Internal Revenue Code Section 45F as amended by the One Big Beautiful Bill Act, July 4, 2025

• U.S. Government Accountability Office, historical Section 45F claim volume

• Bright Horizons Family Solutions and KinderCare Learning Companies, public financial disclosures