SBA 7(a) Fitness Center Feasibility Study in Connecticut

Small loans, outsized place in the state

Gyms and studios in Connecticut took 149 SBA 7(a) loans for $48.4 million of approvals, FY2017 to FY2026. At 24th among states, Connecticut is a middling market for the pairing, but fitness ranks 4 of 39 among Connecticut's own classes, so the category matters more locally than the national position implies. The median loan, $150,000, equals 0.61x the median nationally; the central half of loans lies in a band from $50,000 up to $275,000. Most of that is equipment, leasehold work and working capital, not property purchase. Franchised units make up 36.9% of loans.

Manufacturers and Traders Trust Company has 25 loans and $2.5 million, a small-ticket book. Santander Bank, National Association has 15 loans and $8.2 million, an average several times larger. Liberty Bank has 11. TD Bank, National Association has 10, and Newtek Bank, National Association has 8. These are holder records from SBA, not statements of lending standards. Connecticut reports by planning region: Western Connecticut leads with 35 loans, Fairfield has 31, Capitol 22 and Hartford 20, while New Haven and South Central Connecticut each show 8. Volume peaked at 30 loans in FY2018 and stood at 19 in FY2025.

Reading the floors

Fully 15.0% is the floor for approvals from FY2017 to FY2024 that were cancelled, and the ceiling matches it. Looking at the 70 loans from the FY2017 to FY2021 funded cohort, at least 5.7% stand charged off today, with 2.9% having gone by year five. Anything still open could yet fail, which makes both numbers minimums. None passed our distinctness margin against both Connecticut's overall record and fitness lending nationally, so read them as ordinary for the class, though a cancellation rate that size says many gym plans never reach a closing.

What a Connecticut fitness study must prove

Membership demand comes first: household density within a realistic drive or walk, competing clubs and boutique studios, and the price members will bear. Churn is the central risk, because revenue recurs only while people stay, so the study should model attrition and the cost of replacing members. Build-out and equipment need to be tested against a ticket well beneath the national median, with lease terms and landlord contributions visible. Debt service coverage should include a pre-sale or ramp period and a lean case. A franchise brings fees and a system but not a local track record.