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Build-to-Rent vs Traditional Multifamily: Underwriting Spread Report


Introduction


Institutional investors and lenders in 2025 are scrutinizing how Build-to-Rent (BTR) communities stack up against traditional multifamily (MF) apartments on key underwriting metrics. Both asset types are part of a strong U.S. rental housing market – 2025 saw rental demand hold stable across multifamily and single-family rental sectors. Yet, market sentiment and capital flows reveal divergence: while multifamily transaction activity has been tepid amid higher interest rates, the BTR segment has attracted accelerating investment. This report provides a comparative benchmarking of BTR vs. traditional multifamily on cap rates, DSCR, LTV, yield-on-cost, rent growth, vacancy/turnover, and operating expense ratios, drawing on current data (2025–2026). Key trends in pricing and underwriting assumptions are highlighted, with data tables for side-by-side comparison.


Market Overview: Sentiment & Capital Flows (2025–2026)


Both BTR and traditional apartments benefited from resilient rental demand through 2025, but investment activity differed. Multifamily sales volumes remained muted – total units transacted in late 2025 were 42% below 2018/2019 levels due to a wide bid-ask spread and negative leverage environment. Many multifamily owners held off selling, leading to limited price discovery. Values drifted ~17% below peak 2Q22 levels, although property values stabilized by mid-2025 (even posting a slight +0.3% YoY uptick in 2Q25) as interest rates plateaued. Investors grew cautious: high interest rates and debt costs forced lower leverage and shorter loan terms on apartment. Lenders and agencies responded by tightening standards, often requiring higher Debt Service Coverage Ratios and offering lower leverage than in prior.


By contrast, Build-to-Rent housing emerged as a favored target for new capital. In 2024, the BTR sector saw 28% year-over-year growth with ~$14.8 B in institutional capital deployed, and cumulative BTR investment surged from ~$10 B in 2020 to $58 B by 2024. Major institutions like Blackstone, KKR, and Invitation Homes poured billions into BTR, validating its potential. For 2025, projected BTR capital deployment is $25.4 B (up 32% YoY). This robust inflow reflects investors’ long-term confidence in the BTR model’s stable cash flows and growth prospects, even as traditional multifamily faces near-term headwinds. Indeed, industry analyses indicate BTR offers a “premier real estate investment class” outperforming conventional multifamily by ~180 bps in returns. Drivers include a 3.8 million unit housing deficit boosting demand for rentals, and shifting demographics (e.g. 71% of Gen Z renters prefer single-family style living) that favor BTR formats.


Pricing trends diverged: In multifamily, cap rates in 2025 stabilized around the mid-5% range nationally. First American data show apartment cap rates hovered near 5.7% in 2024–25 after rising in 2022–23, with a slight downward drift by late 2025 as buyer demand returned. Freddie Mac’s outlook at the start of 2025 was for modest rent growth (~2.2%) and a vacancy uptick to ~6.2% as record new supply was absorbed. In other words, multifamily fundamentals remained positive but subdued. Meanwhile, BTR assets commanded premium pricing: JLL Capital Markets noted that stabilized BTR communities trade at cap rates 50–75 bps lower than comparable Class A multifamily. In effect, investors have been willing to pay higher prices (lower cap yields) for BTR, reflecting expectations of stronger rent growth, lower turnover, and perhaps recession-resilient performance. Table 1 summarizes how key underwriting metrics compare between BTR and traditional multifamily as of 2025–2026.

Metric

Build-to-Rent (BTR)

Traditional Multifamily (Apartments)

Cap Rates (Yield)

Stabilized BTR communities trading at lower cap rates: roughly 50–75 bps below Class A MF (e.g. if Class A MF ~5.0%, BTR ~4.3–4.5%). Note: broader SFR sector averages ~7.1% cap in Q4 2025 as smaller rentals carry higher yields.

National apartment cap rates ~5.5–5.7% in 2025, stabilizing after 2022–24 increases. Class A urban assets in top markets traded ~5.0%; B/C class or secondary markets in mid/high-5% to 6%+ range.

Debt Service Coverage (DSCR)

Target DSCR ~1.20–1.25× on stabilized BTR deals, similar to MF. Many lenders still use 1.25× as a benchmark for low-risk assets. Niche DSCR loan programs (non-agency) might accept 1.15×–1.20× if leverage is lower. Overall, BTR loans must meet minimum coverage, but strong NOI and low vacancy help maintain healthy DSCR.

Typical minimum DSCR ~1.25× for agency and bank loans on apartments. In 2025 lenders became more stringent: with higher rates, deals often needed >1.25× DSCR to qualify. For riskier or value-add multifamily, lenders may require 1.30×+ DSCR buffers. Low DSCR (<1.20) will constrain loan proceeds (reduce LTV).

Loan-to-Value (LTV)

Conservative leverage is common. BTR loans often max out around 60–70% LTV, especially for first-time or lease-up projects. Lenders sometimes offset the newer asset class risk by capping LTV in the mid-60s unless sponsor strength is evident. Strong institutional BTR portfolios may achieve higher end of range (70%±) with agencies or debt funds.

Leverage pulled back in 2025: average multifamily LTV ~63% (CBRE) across loans. For quality stabilized assets, 65–75% LTV is achievable, though 70%+ became less common with 2025’s higher rates. Many deals were effectively constrained by DSCR rather than LTV – i.e. hitting 1.25× DSCR often resulted in ~60–65% LTV.

Yield-on-Cost (Dev. Yield)

Development yield-on-cost for BTR typically in the 6–7% range, exceeding comparable new apartment projects. BTR proponents cite a ~180 bps return premium over Class A multifamily. Example: if a new luxury apartment yields ~5.0% on cost, a new BTR community might target ~6.8%. This spread reflects BTR’s rent premiums and efficient lease-up. Some ground-up BTR deals projected IRRs of 15–18% over a 4–5 year hold, highlighting attractive development economics.

New multifamily development yields have compressed in recent years. In 2025, many Class A apartment projects penciled out in the 4.5–5.5% yield-on-cost range, given high construction costs and flat rent growth. This created challenges (negative leverage), as borrowing costs often exceeded initial cap rates. Thus, a yield-on-cost of ~5% for MF vs ~6.5% for BTR illustrates BTR’s potential for better cash-on-cost returns.

Rent Growth Assumptions

Underwriting for BTR is cautious in short-term but optimistic long-term. Given high 2025 supply in many markets, pro forma rent growth is often 1–3% annually for BTR, in line with apartments. Owners prioritize occupancy; indeed, late 2025 saw BTR advertised rents decline ~0.5–1% YoY as landlords kept units full. However, investors expect BTR to enjoy robust rent growth over time due to demographics and limited single-family home affordability. Markets with strong in-migration (Sun Belt, etc.) may still underwrite slightly higher growth (3%+) for BTR, versus more moderate figures in oversupplied urban areas.

Multifamily rent growth underwriting turned decidedly conservative by 2025. Many lenders and investors use 1–2% annual rent growth in pro formas (near inflation). This is a comedown from the 5–10% growth seen in 2021 boom times. Freddie Mac projected 2.2% rent increase in 2025, and Yardi recorded 0% actual growth for 2025 (after a weak Q4). Underwriters differentiate by market: high-supply Sun Belt metros might assume ~0% short-term growth, whereas tight coastal or Midwest markets might allow ~2–3%. Overall, expectations are tempered and heavily stress-tested.

Vacancy & Turnover

Occupancy for stabilized BTR is very high, often 95–97% leased. As of Nov 2025, national SFR/BTR occupancy was 94.9% slightly above multifamily norms. BTR tenants also stay longer on average – lease durations ~24 months vs ~12–18 months in apartments. This means lower turnover (estimated annual turnover ~50% or less in BTR, versus 50–70% in typical apartments). Underwriting models for BTR may assume a vacancy factor around 5% or less and lower turnover costs, given the stronger resident retention (BTR renewal rates can be ~68%, compared to ~52% for apartments).

Multifamily occupancy remains solid but with some pressure from new supply. National apartment occupancy hovered ~95% through 2025 (Yardi reported 95.0% in mid-year, dipping to ~94.5% year-end). Underwritten vacancy is typically 5% for stabilized assets (higher in lease-up or overbuilt submarkets). Turnover is higher in multifamily: average tenant stay ~1–1.5 years. This translates to annual turnover ~60–70% in many markets. Higher turnover means more leasing fees and downtime, which underwriters factor into reserves and pro formas (often a 1–2 month downtime per unit turnover). In 2025, rising concessions in some markets effectively increased economic vacancy for Class A apartments, a risk closely watched in underwriting.

Operating Expense Ratio

Efficiency and cost structure in BTR can yield slightly lower expense ratios. Many BTR communities are new-built and centrally managed, achieving 7–12% higher NOI margins via operational tech and bulk service contracts. Tenants often pay their own utilities and handle minor upkeep (like yards), shifting some costs off the owner. As a result, BTR operating expense ratios might fall in the 35–40% of EGI (effective gross income) range, compared to 45% for a comparable apartment. For example, one study found maintenance costs ~22% lower in BTR vs multifamily due to new construction and single-family design efficiencies. Still, property taxes and insurance are significant for BTR (especially in Sun Belt states), so underwriting must include those accurately.

Operating expenses for apartments have been elevated by inflation, eroding margins. Multifamily expense ratios commonly range 40–50% of gross income (higher for older or affordable assets, lower for Class A). In 2025, insurers hiked premiums substantially (coastal markets saw insurance up 20%+), and property taxes climbed with valuations. Underwriters now model higher OpEx growth (e.g. 3–4% annually) than in prior years. Expense-line scrutiny is high: energy costs, payroll, and turnover costs are all examined. Multifamily owners lack the ability to pass on certain expenses to tenants (except RUBS for utilities in some cases). Thus, DSCR calculations are feeling the pinch from expense growth outpacing revenue. Expense ratios in the mid-40s% are common for stabilized apartments; any upside in operations (expense reduction) is a key focus area for asset managers.

Sources: Loan Analytic Database


Comparative Analysis of Key Metrics


Cap Rates and Valuations


Cap rates encapsulate the pricing spread between BTR and traditional multifamily. As noted, investors in late-2024/2025 valued BTR communities at cap rates 0.5–0.75% lower than top-tier apartment assets. This implies BTR properties, despite being relatively new in institutional portfolios, were often priced richer (higher value per NOI) than comparable apartments. For example, if Class A multifamily in a Sun Belt city traded around a 5.0% cap, a stabilized BTR neighborhood might trade closer to 4.3–4.5%. Such pricing reflects bullish sentiment on BTR’s long-term income stability and growth. It may also factor in the scarcity of large contiguous rental home communities on the market. Meanwhile, the average cap rate for all single-family rentals nationally was about 7.1% in Q4 2025, per Chandan/Arbor data – but this figure skews higher due to many smaller, older SFR assets. New build-to-rent portfolios are achieving much tighter cap rates, in line with or even below multifamily norms.

By contrast, traditional multifamily cap rates stabilized in the mid-5% range on average. After rising through 2023 with interest rate hikes, cap rates plateaued as the Fed held rates high. First American’s CRE model found “multifamily cap rates have stabilized at around 5.7% for the last five quarters” as of mid-2025. In fact, cap rates even declined a few basis points by late 2025 due to renewed buyer interest and slightly lower cost of debt. Still, a negative leverage environment persisted much of 2025 – many multifamily acquisitions had going-in cap rates below the loan interest rates (debt yields remained higher). This “negative leverage” scenario put pressure on values and is one reason transaction volumes were low. Investors required confidence in future NOI growth to justify buying at a 5% cap when borrowing at 6%+. In sum, apartments broadly offered ~5.5% yields at purchase, while BTR traded at tighter ~4.5–5% yields, illustrating a notable underwriting spread in favor of BTR on cap rate.


Debt Service Coverage and LTV (Leverage Constraints)


Debt Service Coverage Ratio (DSCR) and Loan-to-Value (LTV) are intertwined metrics that determine loan sizing. In 2025’s higher-rate climate, DSCR often became the binding constraint on multifamily loan proceeds (more so than LTV). Lenders generally insisted on DSCR of 1.25× or greater for standard multifamily loans. According to a lending advisory, “in short: for a commercial loan in 2025, a DSCR of 1.25× is a safe target for stabilized, low-risk assets”. Deals under that would face reduced leverage or other credit enhancements. Indeed, with interest rates on multifamily loans rising above 6%, many deals penciled at only 1.1–1.2× DSCR, forcing borrowers to inject more equity (lower LTV) to meet bank or agency minimums. Anecdotally, multifamily LTVs that historically were 75%+ dropped to 60–65% in many 2025 financings to maintain ~1.25× DSCR coverage. A Trepp report cited by Largo Capital noted “loan proceeds are now being capped by DSCR, not LTV” in many cases.


For Build-to-Rent, the story is similar but with some nuance. Many BTR projects are financed through debt fund loans or bank portfolio loans that use DSCR-based underwriting (often interest-only periods during lease-up). Sponsors typically target a DSCR in the 1.20× range at stabilization – and some specialized lenders allow slightly lower (1.15×) if LTV is conservative. Non-agency DSCR loan programs have proliferated for single-family rental portfolios, especially in places like Texas and the Sun Belt. These lenders might accept a 1.15× DSCR with 60% LTV, for example, whereas Fannie Mae would require 1.25× for a comparable multifamily deal at 75% LTV. In practice, most stabilized BTR deals aim for ~65% LTV and ~1.25× DSCR, aligning closely with multifamily standards. The difference is more in perceived risk: some lenders limit BTR leverage slightly because the asset class lacks the decades of performance data of apartments. It’s reported that lower leverage (e.g. 60% LTV) and strong reserves can persuade lenders to accept DSCR closer to 1.15–1.20× on BTR deals. But overall, prudent underwriting for BTR debt mirrors multifamily – debt coverage must comfortably exceed 1.2×, especially with today’s high all-in rates.


Yield on Cost and Development Spreads


Underwriting spreads are perhaps most evident in development yield-on-cost comparisons. Build-to-Rent has been touted for delivering superior yields relative to traditional apartment projects. The “1.8% return advantage over Class A multifamily” cited for BTR essentially means that a BTR development can achieve a higher stabilized NOI yield on its total cost basis. For instance, if a new upscale apartment complex only yields 4.5–5.0% on cost (given expensive land and construction and today’s rents), a comparable BTR community might achieve 6.0–7.0%. The Cavan Companies’ BTR outlook noted target IRRs of 15–18% over a 4–5 year hold for ground-up BTR in 2024–25, which imply healthy development yields fueling those returns. Higher rents (often 10–15% above comparable apartments) and lower vacancy drive this outperformance. For example, if large 3-bedroom BTR homes rent at a premium to a 3-bedroom apartment, yet cost per unit is similar (excluding land, which might even be cheaper in suburban BTR locations), the yield is boosted.


Traditional multifamily developers in 2025 faced a tighter spread: rising construction costs and flat rents squeezed apartment yield-on-cost to very low levels. Many deals underwrote exits at cap rates equal to or above the going-in yield, meaning little room for error. This is why some merchant builders paused projects – “developer economics are squeezed by increasing construction costs combined with low property value appreciation,” as JBREC observed. Those who proceed with multifamily construction often bank on rents accelerating by 2027+ or interest rates falling to create value. In comparison, BTR’s yield advantage (partly from operational efficiencies) provides a buffer. It’s important for investors: a higher yield-on-cost in BTR can mean a project is viable with less rent growth or cap rate compression needed. This dynamic has drawn capital to BTR development despite overall cautious construction lending.


Rent Growth Expectations


Both BTR and traditional multifamily underwriters have tempered their rent growth projections for the near term (2025–2026), after the extraordinary rent spikes of 2021. Freddie Mac’s multifamily outlook for 2025 predicted rent growth roughly in line with inflation (~2.2% nationally) and indeed characterized it as “below the long-term average”. Yardi Matrix data showed 0% YoY effective rent growth in 2025 for apartments (as a weak Q4 wiped out earlier gains). Underwriting in late 2025 often assumes minimal growth (0–2%) for year 1, maybe rising to 2–3% in outer years for stronger markets. The emphasis is on granular, local assumptions: oversupplied submarkets (e.g. Austin, Phoenix) get very conservative rent bumps or even flat projections, whereas undersupplied markets might justify a bit more.


For Build-to-Rent, underwriters similarly are cautious in the immediate term, especially in high-supply metro areas. Interestingly, BTR rent trends in late 2025 mirrored multifamily’s slowdown – Yardi reported that advertised BTR rents declined 0.5% YoY as of Nov 2025, as owners moderated asking rents. BTR analysts noted this was strategic: “demand is holding up better than pricing power,” meaning BTR landlords chose to keep occupancy high by limiting rent increases. This suggests underwritten rent growth for 2025–2026 in BTR is likely modest (perhaps 1–3% annually, depending on market). However, longer-term BTR investors may underwrite higher CAGR of rents than multifamily in select locations, banking on the idea that the renter-by-choice demographic (families, higher-income tenants) will pay growing premiums for single-family style living. Supporting this, industry research highlights that high-income renter households grew post-pandemic and many prefer BTR, potentially boosting demand and rent growth beyond what generic apartments might see. In summary, near-term rent growth assumptions are restrained for both asset types – the days of 5%+ annual rent hikes are gone for now – but BTR’s narrative allows a bit more optimism beyond 2026 due to structural housing shortages and lifestyle shifts.


Vacancy and Turnover


One clear operational advantage for BTR is lower resident turnover. Families and individuals renting single-family homes tend to treat them as longer-term residences. Data from Cavan’s research indicates average BTR lease length around 24 months, versus ~14–18 months for traditional apartment leases. This is a substantial difference. In underwriting terms, if an apartment community expects ~50% of tenants to renew each year (thus 50% turnover), a BTR community might see 65–70% renewals (only 30–35% turnover). Lower turnover translates to reduced downtime, lower releasing costs, and higher effective occupancy over time. Indeed, BTR operators have reported renewal rates ~68% compared to ~52% for apartments. Underwriting models for BTR can thus budget less annual rent loss to vacancy. Often a 3–5% vacancy rate is used for stabilized BTR (similar to apartments), but with an expectation that physical occupancy will remain very high if the product is in demand.


As of late 2025, occupancy rates in professionally managed BTR were just under 95% nationally, very close to multifamily occupancy which was ~94–95%. Both sectors maintain strong occupancy in aggregate, even with supply growth. However, in high-supply submarkets, apartments have seen occupancy slip and concessions rise, whereas BTR (often located in suburbs with more limited new supply of single-family rentals) has generally held occupancy better. Turnover is the key differentiator – it’s simply easier to retain a family renting a house (who might have local jobs and kids in schools) than a transient apartment renter. Therefore, underwriting for BTR often uses lower expected turnover costs (painting, cleaning, incentives) per year. Multifamily underwriting, especially for Class A assets, had to increase assumptions for concessions and turnover in 2025, given heavy new deliveries in some markets causing tenants to move for deals. This dynamic makes BTR’s stability attractive to lenders: more stable occupancy means more stable cash flow, bolstering DSCR. It’s worth noting that in downturn scenarios, single-family rentals have historically performed well occupancy-wise (renters trade down from ownership or from more expensive urban units). That counter-cyclical demand is another reason BTR vacancy assumptions can be as low or lower than multifamily.


Operating Expenses and NOI Margins


Operating expense profile is another area of nuanced difference. Build-to-Rent properties often achieve expense efficiencies through scale and outsourcing. Many BTR communities are new constructions with modern, durable materials – this helps keep maintenance costs low initially. Additionally, if properties are scattered-site, BTR operators use tech platforms and centralized teams to manage them, which can drive what one report cited as 7–12% higher NOI margins via centralized management and tech. Specific areas of savings include: no elevators or interior common areas to maintain (compared to mid-rise apartments), tenants typically paying all utilities directly (owner doesn’t incur those, whereas apartments often pay for water/trash or bundle utilities), and possibly landscaping costs passed through or minimal (small yards). The Cavan white paper noted a 22% reduction in maintenance costs for BTR relative to conventional apartments – presumably because each unit is a separate home with new appliances and systems, reducing frequent service calls seen in older multi-unit buildings.


However, BTR isn’t without expenses – property taxes can actually be higher per unit than a large apartment (since single-family homes might be assessed at higher valuations individually). Insurance can also be significant (more roofs to insure, though each home’s replacement cost is less than a whole apartment building). Underwriters pay close attention to these, especially after 2023–2025’s insurance premium spikes and tax reassessments in many Sun Belt states. In general, though, an operating expense ratio (OpEx as % of income) in the high-30s% for BTR might be achievable, versus mid-40s% for a comparable multifamily. This means BTR could convert a few more cents of each rent dollar into NOI. Importantly, expense growth assumptions are currently elevated for both sectors – inflation impacts labor, utilities, and repair costs across the board. Underwriters in 2025 are modeling higher OpEx growth rates than historically (e.g. 3%+ per year). This slightly diminishes BTR’s edge, but the lower starting ratio still helps. A practical example: Suppose each BTR unit generates $25,000 annual rent. If operating costs are 40%, NOI is $15,000. An equivalent apartment unit might also get $25,000 rent but incur 50% expenses, leaving $12,500 NOI. Over a large portfolio, that difference is significant for valuation and DSCR.


From a lender’s perspective, stronger NOI margins and predictable expenses improve loan metrics. In 2025, many multifamily deals saw NOI growth stall because expense growth outpaced revenue (expenses up ~5%, revenue flat, yielding NOI decline). BTR’s expense ratio advantage can buffer some of that pressure. Lenders still underwrite both asset types with cushions – e.g. assuming a certain capital reserve per unit per year for repairs ($250–300 for apartments, maybe similar or a bit more for BTR given larger unit size). But if BTR has lower turnover and newer vintage, some underwriters might accept slightly lower replacement reserves or OpEx ratios, effectively increasing underwritten cash flow.


Conclusion and Outlook


In summary, Build-to-Rent assets show a favorable underwriting spread relative to traditional multifamily in several areas: cap rates, yields, and possibly NOI margins. BTR deals in 2025 traded at lower cap rates (higher pricing) because investors foresee more resilient cash flows and growth, and lenders have grown comfortable with the asset performance to date. Traditional multifamily remains a stable, core asset class – its nationwide occupancy and long-term demand drivers are strong – but it’s grappling with a wave of new supply and high financing costs that compress underwriting metrics.


Looking ahead into 2026, market sentiment is cautiously optimistic for both sectors. Greater stability in 2026 (as GDP growth continues and rate volatility eases) could “help lift consumer confidence and support a gradual rebound in rental demand,” according to Yardi analysts. This would benefit all rentals, potentially allowing for a bit more rent growth and easing of negative leverage. Multifamily cap rates are forecasted by some (e.g. First American PCR model) to decline slightly (~0.3%) by end of 2025 if transaction volume increases, which would carry into 2026 valuations. For BTR, the pipeline of new communities is growing (expected to comprise ~6–7% of new rental supply in 2025–2026). As BTR matures, underwriting will be further refined by real performance data. Early evidence suggests strong occupancy and rent collections even during market softening, reinforcing BTR’s profile as a hybrid of single-family stability and multifamily efficiency.


Institutional capital is expected to continue flowing into BTR in 2026, albeit selectively – likely focused on high-demand suburban markets and projects by experienced sponsors. Multifamily capital flows, while down from 2021 highs, may also pick up if interest rates indeed stabilize or fall. Lenders, including agencies like Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, are expanding programs to support a range of rental housing (Freddie Mac’s 2025 volume increased 17% over 2024 to $77.6 B, indicating ample liquidity for multifamily). It’s notable that BTR is carving out its own category – Freddie Mac in 2024 financed pilot programs for single-family rental portfolios, and some recent policy moves (e.g. in the U.S. administration) specifically exclude true build-to-rent development from anti-institutional buying measures. This suggests recognition that BTR adds needed housing supply.


In conclusion, from an underwriting standpoint, Build-to-Rent offers slightly higher yields and potentially more cushion in DSCR and expenses, thanks to rent premiums and lower turnover, whereas traditional multifamily offers deep liquidity and a long track record, with broadly reliable (if currently flat) performance. Both asset types see underwriters applying more conservative assumptions in 2025–2026 – lower leverage, higher coverage, modest rent growth – to ensure deals pencil out in a high-rate environment. Investors and lenders comparing BTR vs. MF should weigh these factors in context: market location, sponsor experience, and deal structure will ultimately dictate how each metric is underwritten. But the benchmarking data shows BTR holding its own as an institutional asset class, often outperforming on key spreads, which underpins the strong market sentiment and capital allocated to it in the past two years.


Sources


  1. Loan Analytics Database (MMCG) - Aggregated lender term sheets and closed-loan snapshots (2024–2026): cap rates, DSCR, LTV, debt pricing (SOFR spreads), amortization/IO structures, and stabilization assumptions across BTR and traditional multifamily.

  2. Loan Analytics Database (MMCG) - Underwriting benchmark library (2025–2026): rent growth assumptions, vacancy/credit loss ranges, turnover/lease-up pacing, replacement reserves, and operating expense ratio benchmarks by asset class and market tier.

  3. Loan Analytics Database (MMCG) - Comparable deal compendium (2025–2026): yield-on-cost targets, exit cap rate assumptions, and sensitivity cases used in lender packages for BTR communities and conventional multifamily acquisitions/development.

 
 
 

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